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This doctrine is substantially the same as that which Immanuel Kant proposed a century ago — with this difference, that Kant did not pretend to do more than construct a theory, whereas Professor Rehmke is giving us a description of facts (p. 435). “Choose your examples where you will,” he says, “you will find this proposition always confirmed. Freedom is asserted only of the concrete, necessity is justly applied only to the abstract, that is, to the determination of the concrete.” Four pages later we learn that the soul alone is a concrete thing in the sense here meant — in the sense of an indivisible concrete — and that freedom cannot be asserted of material things. I need not say that this strips the appeal to facts of its whole meaning.

Without discussing the theory in general, we may ask how it is connected with the doctrine of the interaction of soul and body. We are told that the presence of two concrete things, soul and body, is the necessary condition of action. Change in the one concrete seems to be determined by the presence of the other. But the will is determined by the cognitive consciousness. This is determined by the brain-state. Nevertheless the individual is free, that is, is determined only by himself. I do not find that Professor Rehmke anywhere shows how these statements are to be brought into harmony.

The volume closes with a section on the life of the soul, in which such topics are treated as the consciousness of time, memory, and imagination. Many chapters are missing that one would expect to find in a text-book on psychology. All the material collected by experimental psychology is rejected as belonging to physiology, while logic and epistemology have deprived us of other chapters. The general aim of the book is to show that the traditional views of the mind can, with the aid of Kantian and Berkeleyan metaphysic, be made reasonable and harmonious. I do not think the attempt has proved in any way successful. On the other hand, the criticisms of the more modern views are frequently keen and go to the roots of things, and one can hardly read the book without being stimulated to greater caution and more careful analysis.

W. FITE.

Outlines of Psychology. By OSWALD KÜLPE. Translated by EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1895. — pp. xi, 462.

To the translator of this book great credit is due for the smooth and readable English in which he has rehabilitated the German

original. A slight tendency to employ unusual and almost archaic expressions, to avoid trifling circumlocutions, constitutes the only ground upon which the most scrupulous reader can offer criticism. Unfortunately, the good English is offset by a considerable number of distressing typographical errors.¹

Dr. Titchener has not been simply a translator, however. He is, in a modest way, joint editor. Külpe himself has made a few insignificant changes in the text, to which under his direction the translator adds a few paragraphs. Many cross references are filled in, an index of names is added, and Külpe's own experiments are printed in small type — an unpleasant method of designation, for the type is nowhere too large for comfort. It would have been a welcome departure from the usage of the original, if Dr. Titchener had seen fit to add to the bibliography, with reference especially to students who do not read German readily. It is true we have no considerable amount of good experimental literature in English, but this is simply additional reason for giving the student some acquaintance with what there is. Taken all in all, however, the translation is a decidedly more useful book than the German edition.

The psychological public is already familiar with the more salient characteristics of the book, which was widely, and in the main favorably, reviewed upon its appearance in 1893. Although no such purpose is explicitly avowed, the present translation has its principal *raison d'être* as a text-book. In any event it is certain to be used as such, and it is therefore desirable to supplement the previous reviews by some discussion of the book from this general standpoint — not merely from the mechanical point of view, as regards its fitness for American class-room use, but also with reference to the wider question of the general trend of psychological thinking upon which it is based and to which it leads.

Concerning the first of these matters I must admit, as the result of some little experience with the book, both in its German and English form, that students find considerable difficulty in following the exceedingly concise, compact statements so often made. This militates against the successful use of the work, save by decidedly advanced students. A further difficulty attaching to the use of the book by American students, arises from the fact that most of them have already in mind the standpoint and method of some one or

¹ This is in some measure excusable because of the conditions under which the book was published, translator and printer being on opposite sides of the Atlantic. A list of corrected errata has already been issued.

more English authors, and with these it is no easy matter to reconcile Külpe's form of treatment. With intelligent supervision, however, this fact can of course be utilized to give the student a much more masterly and complete grip of his subject than has hitherto been feasible, while familiarizing him at the same time with something of the spirit and flesh of the experimental methods. Were the objections to the book on these general grounds twice as serious as they are, I for one should still be exceedingly grateful to both author and translator for enabling me to give my classes a work which, however much one may differ from its doctrines, constitutes a reasonably complete statement of human psychic processes in the light of experimental observations. No student is likely to use the book without gaining a stimulating admiration and respect for the broad scholarship of the author, and for the tireless energy and patience with which he has so obviously labored.

In taking up the second of the two points above mentioned, I shall attempt to discuss only one or two aspects of the problem involved. As will be remembered, feeling and sensation, according to Külpe, are the elements of conscious processes from which all other mental products are formed, either by 'fusion,' in which the constituent elements suffer loss of distinctness, or by 'colligation,' in which the combined elements gain in distinctness. Will, so far as it is at all possible to differentiate a distinct mental content thereby, is characterized simply by groups of particular sensations, among which sensations of strain are especially prominent. As a logical scheme for psychological classification, this method of treatment is perfectly defensible and unambiguous; as to how far the author succeeds in manipulating it, opinion will probably differ. One cannot help feeling that the detail has not been quite fully worked out, when it becomes necessary to discuss side by side in the same chapter the facts concerning simple reactions and those of the contrasts of brightness and color. The question regarding the real elements of consciousness is of course merely one of fact, concerning which each investigator must for the present satisfy himself by the deliverances of his own consciousness. Meantime it must be observed that, while Külpe's principle of classification is logically sound and on the whole substantiated by the trend of experimental work, it can by no means supersede such a method as that employed, for example, by James. Külpe practically begins to write where James leaves off. The elements with which the former begins, are not, as the latter so keenly points out, ever given ready-made into our hands. They represent

the last results of painstaking analysis. Once the analysis is made, and thoroughly made with the assistance of experimentation, it is then legitimate to go ahead and construct one's synthetic account of the processes involved, exactly as does any writer on physics. In short, all that James claims for his method of procedure is true, in so far as it relates to investigation. When it comes to orderly presentation the procedure of Külpe,¹ which is the common method, certainly has many, if not paramount, advantages. As so often happens in such cases, the truth includes the contentions of both parties. If it be true that a synthesis without an analysis is impossible, it is equally and inevitably true that an analysis without a synthesis is useless.

We may go the whole way with Külpe and several other contemporary writers in denying that Will as such can be differentiated, save in so far as it consists in certain groups of sensations, while we still protest that the general attitude which he maintains toward mental activities is, if not erroneous in actual fact, at least misleading in its tendency and implication. Leave alone the merely theoretical sides of the matter, the practical results of the recently increasing emphasis upon consciousness as activity demand peculiarly cogent reasons, if one is to neglect this phase of mental life. If it were merely a matter of terminology, one would urge no objection because only twenty-two pages are devoted to the chapters on attention, and only five pages to that upon will, both of them being designated as "general aspects" of consciousness. It is rather because so little importance is throughout the book attached to activity as such, that the reviewer is inclined to feel that something of the living organism has been lost in the analyses, that we have been given only the anatomy and not the physiology of the mind. Wundt has been severely enough criticised for his doctrine of apperception, but the constant reference which he makes to it, in so far as it is a reference to the activities of consciousness, is far more hopeful, both in its immediate and remote applications, than the more or less static conceptions which Külpe gives us. The explicit support given to this Wundtian creation, in a paragraph near the end of Külpe's book, only serves to lend additional emphasis to the essential neglect of the

¹ Certain omissions in the text are rather startling to readers brought up on English psychology. They are doubtless purposeful and made for cause, but one doubts if they can be wholly justified. Thus one misses any treatment of conception and of belief, and any adequate account of reasoning, in the common English sense of the word.

doctrine throughout the rest of the work.¹ A psychology which fails to give a satisfactory account of conscious activities as activities, or at least to provide a place for such an account, has certainly left untouched one large portion of its proper field, and denied itself the opportunity of being most helpful to ethics and pedagogy.

Külpe confines himself so rigorously to the exposition of his psychology, and diverges so rarely to explain or defend the principles on which his procedure rests, that the reviewer is constantly in doubt as to whether he is criticising justly. With something of this doubt, I have commented on what seem to me some weaknesses in the book. The better the book, the more necessary it is to do this. Of its many striking merits I cannot speak in detail. The masterly treatment of sensation and the methods of mensuration applicable to it; the lucid accounts of a score of methods of experimentation upon various psychological processes; the carefully evaluated digests of the results of such experimentation; the suggestive criticisms upon current psychological doctrine — all these and many other valuable characteristics of the book have been dwelt on by other reviewers. Better than all else, perhaps, is the bracing atmosphere of finished scholarship which pervades it. It certainly deserves to rank among the best of our psychologies.

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¹ The very inadequate treatment of impulse, and the too brief, though excellent, account of emotion, are illustrations of the general tendency to which I refer.